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In the Supreme Cotirt of the 
State of Utah 
JAY 0. BARNHART and VIDA N. 
BARNHART, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEEJS 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE 
) NO. 10133 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Respondents accept appellant's statement. 
DISPOSITION IN WWER COURT 
Respondents accept appellant's statement .. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affumation of judgment below. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Basically the respondents agree with the facts Slllib-
mltted by appellant; however, there are a few important 
and salient areas wherein the facts are in o<mtrorv&Sy, and 
the appellant's statement of facts fiail to show the contro-
verted facts. These are: 
(1) The respondent may have been 82 feet south 
of the break in the double yellow lines, but she was still 
in a position to make the left hand turn ornto old Hli:ghway 
91 within the area designated "G", whlch is commonly used 
for making the turn onto old U. S. 91. (R. 5·9; TR. 27). 
(2) The respondent, Mrs. Barnhart, did not see any 
north bOIUilld truck intending to make a left hand turn across 
the south bound lanes. (R. 59; TR. 49). She stated that 
she looked in 'beT rear view mirTor (R. 59; TR. 49) and 
that she saw the driver, Wei1cker, approaching her and 
that she had an opportunity to bra~ce hemelf momentarily 
prior to the collision. (R. 59; TR. ~9). She at no time 
saw :the truck referred to by Weicker and it is not likely 
that the truck existed, based upon her a:bilities to observe 
and the ciTcumstances surrounding the collision. 
( 3) Entrance to the old Hlighway 91 involves a large 
approach apron that is several hundred feet in width. The 
approach is on the curve of the highway as it runs east and 
west and then curves toward the south. (See EXhibit 2). 
(4) The facts concerning insurance eorverage are con-
tained under the designatioo B. The facts as to insurance 
coverage, are substantially correct. The main difference 
is that prior to the trial of this case, 1lhe plaintiffs, of their 
own mortion, dismrssed their cause concerning loss of con-
sortium on behalf of Mr. Barnhart. (R. 59; TR. 3). This 
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dismissal did not take place at the appellant's instant nor 
ut>On motion of the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINr I 
THE JUDGMENT RENDERED IS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE AF-
Ii'JRMED. 
POINT n 
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN CONTRAGrS 
ARE SEVERABLE FROM TI-lE CONTRACT AND ARE 
VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE. 
There was substantial evidence available to the court 
to justify the conclusion that it came to. The key to the 
c11tire problem of fact could probaJbly be answered in stat-
ing that even if the respondent violated the statutory stan-
ard of care, which the respondent denies, this violation 
would not prohibit the recovery if it was not a proximate 
cause contributing to the injury. The key to the question 
was whet.~er the respondent's conduct in any way prooci-
mately caused the collision. The court rightfully held that 
it did not. 
Even accepting Welcker's, the uninsured motorist's, 
version of the collision, no fault or blame, causation wise, 
can be placed upon Mrs. Barnhart. (R. 59; TR. 11, ·12, 
13). The truck never came into his lane of tmffic, never 
crossed in front of him, was not observed by Mrs. Barn-
hart, and mysteriously vanished after the collision. (R. 
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59; TR. 16.). In fact Welcker's tes:timony was inoo.nsistent. 
For eX1ample, the following: 
"Q. If this were west, going this way, (Indicat-
ing), would yoo say the Olsen truck was in this vi-
cinity, somewhere, where I am pointing? 
"A. Yes, siT, I think so. 
"Q. And was it signaling to make a turn into 
the opposite lane of traffic? 
"A. Well, I am not sure. When I seen him last, 
he was parked on t!he side of the road near the field." 
R. 59; TR. 16). 
W elcker further testified that he was not sure if he 
had to leave his lane of traffic to go around fue truck, but 
if so, "just a little bit." (R. 59; TR. 13). He also stated 
that tile impact involved the right front of his vehicle and 
the left reax of the plaintiff's vehicle. Mr. Welcker even 
pla~ced and labeled the vehicles on :the diagmm. (Exhibit 
2, R. 59; TR. 16, 19, 20 & 21). It would be difficult to 
correlate the diagram with hds testimony. The testimony 
and diagram certainly do not e:oou:se the negli:gence of 
We1cker and do justify the eourt's finding of fact based 
upon substantial evidenJce. '.Dhe rule is specifically set out 
in Prim v. Prim, 45 Cal. 2d 690, 299 P. 2d 231: 
"This is the sole question presented for determination: 
:Ls there substantial evidence in the record to support 
the findings of fact serf: forth above? 
"Yes. The rule is esta!blished :that when a. finding of 
fact is attacked on tlhe ground that there is not any 
substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of the 
appellate cou.rt begins and ends with a detemrlnatioo 
as to wllefuer there is any substantial evidence, coo-
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tradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the 
findiug of fact." 
(Jensen v. Union Paving Company, 97 2d Cal. App. 637, 
218 P. 2d 134; Johnson v. Nas, 50 Wash. 2d 87, 309 P. 380; 
Laurence v. Brunberger Railroad Co., 3 Utah 2d 247, 282 
P.2d ~~~5; O'Gara v. Findlay, 6 Utah 2d 102, 306 P. 2d 1073.) 
POINT II 
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN CONI'RAGrS ARE 
SEVERABLE FROM THE CONTRACI' AND ARE VOID 
AND UNENFORCEABLE. 
The main point of argument raised by the appellant 
concerns the arbitration provision in 1Jhe ·contract. Appel-
lant begins i:ts dissertation by quoting articles from insur-
ance company publications, to-wit: Plwnmer's article in 
the Insurance Law Journ·al and Fieting's article in Best's 
Insurance News, Fire and Casualty edition. We do not 
believe that articles in particular trade journals are au-
thorative citations in court. These articles, however, give 
the respondent an opportunity to reply in kind, in an essay 
form, concerning arbitration. The articles cited are from 
a strictly biased standpoint and overlook the fact that 
plaintiffs seldom have sufficient oontinuity of interest to 
publish law journals, to retain permanent counsel or to 
write essays on particular legal theorems. 
The clause cited in the insurance contract required 
arbitration "in accordance with the rules of the American 
Arbitration Association, and judgment upon :the award 
rendered by the arbitrators may be entered in any court 
having jurisdiction thereof." We respectfully suibrnit to 
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the Court that such a p~ovision is a genuine attempt to 
relieve the courts of jurisdiction over eauses that are in-
herently judicial in nature. We respectfully state to the 
court that such a provision is an unco!llStitutional depriva-
tion to the parties of a right to have their matter heard in 
court and of a right to have a jury trial if they so des:ire. 
The unfair aspect of this particular pro!Vi:sion to tihe 
unwary insurance purchaser is that the American Arbi-
tration Association is not an impartial, unbiased tribunal 
fior the hearing of insurance matters. 
The American Mbitration Association, insofar as un-
insured motorists we concerned, is the minion of the in-
su~ance ,companies combined. The filing fees, althO/Ugh 
less than nominal, are insufficient to support its operation. 
It is an organization that exists on the gratuities of tlhe 
insurance company. 
According to the literature o!f the Amerioan Arbitra-
tion Association, m 1950, at the instance of certain insur-
ance companies, they agreed to arbitrate claims for the 
insurance companies if provision for such arbitration was 
provided in the insurance companies' policies. The Ameri-
can Arbitration Association literature states "It was their 
(the insurance oon1panies) desire that the fee for such ar-
bitrations be set at a· nominal amonnt of no greater than 
$50.00, rather than have it in accordance with the schedule 
of fees prescribed in our commercial rules.*** The asso-
ciation agreed to write a speci8l set of rules incorpornting 
the $50.00 fee. Because the insurance companies in tum 
agreed that they wo~d subscribe to a special budget to 
cover the difference between what the association would 
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receive at the nominal $50.00 rate and the rate of fees m-
der tlw commercial arbitration rules. •• •" 
The motto of the American Association is "speed, 
eeonomy, justice." It is rather interesting that Mr. Fieting 
in Best's Insurance News, Fire and Casualty edition, Oc-
tobl'l', 1961, state3 the purpose of arbitration is "Pro~de a 
speedy, just and economical means for deteTillining the 
amount of the insurer's payment liability." The American 
Arbitration Association claims to have used those terms 
since 1926. The point of the dissertation bedng that Fiet-
ing's article is northing more than a propaganda disserta-
tion for and on behalf of the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation. 
Under the title "Selecting the Arbitrator" the litera-
ture of the American Arbitration Association states: 
"The next step involved is the selection of the arbitra-
tor. A ~aclal accident claims panel of arbitratoTS 
has been created consisting of attorneys who have 
been nominated by bar associations throughout the 
country or by other attorneys who are nort commer-
cial arbitrators of this association's national panel. To 
give the insurance companies and the policy holders 
the most acceptable arbitrators, one rule is that no 
attorney working for an insurance company or special-
izing in negligence cases may seTVe in- accident claims 
cases. Arhitraton; are appointed administratively by 
the Association without the submission of lists to the 
parties. • • *" 
One rmght ask what 'the other rules are for the selec-
tion of arbitrators which are not specified in the liter-
ature furnished to the insured or his counsel. Undoubt-
edly, the insurance companies are better 'acquainted with 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
the rules for the selection of an arbitrator than those who 
receive the literature. 
UndeT Section 11 of its aooident clims rules, the liti-
gants are informed as foUorvvs: 
"The arbitrators will be appomted from a special acci-
dent daims panel. Members of the panel serve with-
out fee in accident daims arbibraUons. In prolonged 
or in special oases, the parties n1ay agree to the pay-
ment of a fee. Any arrangement [or the oompensa-
tioo of a panel arbitrator shall be made only tlwough 
the :administrator.'' 
Claimant's attorneys who have had experience befo['e 
the Arbitration Ass:ociartioo contend that in many instances 
the arbitrators are unqualified because of lack of e;qJerlence 
or are seeking only recognition from those who ean prop'" 
erly reward such talents. The proceeding is tried in a 
most informal basis without a record, and the litigants 
must necessarily depend upon the note taking of the ar-
bitrator, who does not have available to him a court re-
porter or a reco['d from which he could clarify a ,coo.fus-
ing aspect of the case upon delibeTation. If a record is 
to be kept, it has to be kept by one of the parties at the 
party's expense, whlch, of course, is of no value to the 
arbitrator. Furthermore, the rules provide no means for 
a:ppeal. The decision of the arbitrator is final. 
Thel}e are many shortcomings in arbitration and many 
reasons why a person might prefeT to litigate his cases in 
court where he had the right of due process. Due p-rocess 
presumes a fair hearing from beginning to end with the 
right of appeal in O['lder to review posSiible error of the trial 
judge, such as that the appellant claims here burt which it 
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woulu deny the re3pondent by arbitration. The arbitrator 
acts informally and, acc'Ording to the publications of the 
American Arbitration Society, "The object of examination 
of witnesses is to get the fact; arbitrators will usually per-
ml t witnesse,:; to go somewhat afield as long as relevant 
Llds are being produced. ,.,u, "He (the arbitrartoc) is the 
one who must be convinced, not a jury of laymen who might 
perhaps be more taken in by flights of flowery appeal. He 
(the arbitrator) will recognize that the common law rules 
ot evidence are not strictly applied. This does not mean 
he will calmly admit all sorts of irrelevant matters and 
hearsay evidence. He (the lawyer) knoiWs thaJt tJhe arbi-
trator will recognize weak evidence for what it is and will 
reco~,UZe the deficiencies of second and third hand testi-
mony.'' 
We respectfully state that this is a country that has 
long ·nurtured and cherished the jury system and has es-
poused a confidence in it that has prohibited a change in it 
for a hundred and seventy-five years. It is one of the very 
foundations of our Constitutional system and is pr01vided 
for in the Constitution of the United States ·and of all of 
the states in the Union. 
The reason insurance companies desire an artbitration 
panel is obvious. It merely means that one of the litigants, 
the insurance company, wants to try its case be·fore a select 
court. It merely moons hearsay testimony, seoondary and 
insubstantial evidence, inuendo and implication are the hall-
marks of trial by arbitration, which are rightfully prohi!bi-
tPJ in a court of law. It merely means that the insurance 
companies, by this devious route, have selected a battle 
ground wherein they control all of the command points 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
and have full and sometimes exclusive knowledge of the 
terrain. It is a battle fie1d upon which they have fought 
numerous battles and upon which their captains are daily 
associated with the personnel of the supposedly neutral ref-
eree. 'Dhe a~bitrator, in the coUTse of !his experience, may 
sit on a number of cases in which counsel :f.or the insurance 
company appears, but he is not like~y to see counsel for 
the litigant or the litigant himself on any more than one 
occasion. 
The AAA claims that their process is speedy. Some 
claimants 1oontend that ~hey could have had a much more 
rapid hearing in a court of law. One case that counsel for 
the respondent is familiar with had a request forr arbitra-
tion duly filed on February 13, 1963, and without delay 
caused by either litigant, the case was ultimately tried on 
January 30th, 1964, before the wbitratiorn tr.ihunal.. If 
this is a standard, one might w<mder if that is "speedy." 
The AAA and 1he appellant contend that arbitration 
is just. The respondent has podnrted out many unjust fea-
tures abo~e, of which the f1oilowing are the most flagrant 
examples: 
1. There is no pDovision :f.orr requiring testimony from 
out of state witnesses. 
2. In marny states, such as Utah, there is no provision 
for the attendanoe of witnesses within the forum. 
3. The selection of the arbitrator 1s made by the As-
sociation irrespective of experience or motives and the in-
surance oompanies are muah moDe likely to be associated 
and acquainted with him than the da.imant. 
4. The arbitrator is immune from mistake. There is 
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no method by which his finding can be appealed nor his 
errors corrected. 
5. The arbitration forum selected is a forum of the 
insurance companies and denies the claimant an equal right 
of appointment. 
6. The rules of evidence by which the rights of the 
claim:ant are protected are abandoned if the arbitrator so 
desires and, therefore, there is no hope of due process as 
the claimant might expect in a eourt of law. 
7. The !Claimant is forced to litigate at a place selec-
ted by the Arbitration Association regardless of ~conven­
ience to himself and witnesses, which, according to the rules 
of the American Arbitration Association, may be within or 
without the state wherein the ccurrence happened. 
8. Witnesses are not requiTed to testify under oath 
and, therefore, the moral sanction that attends a proceed-
ing at law are denied the litigant. 
9. The evidence may ibe introduced that is completely 
hearsay and .evidence may be introduced by affidavit, theTe-
by denying the litigant of a right of cross e~aminati0111. 
The AAA contends that their proceeding is econom-
ical. The filing fee for the claimant is $50.00. The cost 
of each day the proceeding exceeds the first day is $25.00. 
In the event that the proceeding runs ,afteT 6:00 P.M. on 
any day, the charge is $3.00 per hour. All chargeable to 
the claimant if he institutes the proceeding. Rule 4, Sec-
tion 11, indicates that in certain cases "in prolonged or in 
~dal cases, the parties may agree to the payment of a 
fee" to the arbitrator. Under what circumstances these 
might be, the claimant does not know. 
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Another interesting aspect to the "economical" claim 
of the Arbitration Society is that specified under Se·ctioo 
16, Taking of a Stenographic Record: 
"The tribunal dea:-k shall make the necessary arrange-
ments .for the taking of steno~aphic record of the 
testimony whenever such record is requested by one 
or more parties. 'I1he requesting party oc parties shall 
pay the ·cost of such recoro as provided in Rule 8, Sec-
tion 38." 
As pointed out above, 1Jhe claimant is required, if he 
wants a record, to pay the ·oost orf the reporter plus the 
cost o!f transcribing, if it is to be O!f any benefit to the arbi-
trator. 'Dhis, as all lawyers will attest, is no small charge. 
The claimant must arrange fbr and pay for the attendance 
of witness and in states where such attendance is not pro-
vided for by statute, as in this state, the obtaining o!f witnes-
ses becomes an extreme hardship upon the claimant and, 
needless to say, an e~, for there are few witnesses who 
desire to attend for the witness fees provided by law. 
We have taken ·considerable time to controvert the sug-
gestio!l1!s in rthe journals quoted as authorities. We respect-
fully state that our opinion, based upon experience, would 
be as persuasive as the opinion of an insuTance company 
attorney writing in an insurance law journal concerning a 
matter in which he has a prejudicial interest. We respect-
fully state that these citations are not authority and should 
not be given any more weight or treated with any more 
dignity than the reflections of counsel :Lior the respondent 
set forth aborve. 
Getting to the real meat of the question raised, it should 
be sufficient to state that the Utah Supreme Court on three 
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occasions and the United States District Court in and for 
the District of Utah on one occasion, (Shumaker v. Utex 
Ex-ploration Co., 157 F. Supp. 68), has stated the provi-
sions substantially similar to that contained in this insur-
i.Lnt-e policy are void for good and sound reasons. Those 
casls, with the exception of the Shumaker case, were cited 
by the appellant, but the appellant casually says that they 
are distinguishable. This same argument was made to 1Jhe 
learned trial judge who, after listening to the wguments 
and taking the case under advise·ment, was nnconvinced. 
For example, the distinction made between the Fox Film 
Corporation vs. Ogden Theatre case, 82 Utah 279, 17 Pac. 
2d 29-l, and this case see1ns to be that arbitration in this 
case does not deal with procedure, but with substance of 
the agreement ·and that arbitration in the Fox Film CoTIJo-
ration case dealt with procedure and nort substance. By 
what method the appellant is able to oome to this conclu-
sion is not known to the respondent. One would think that 
the statements of the court in that case would be good evi-
dence of the intent of that court and the field they inten-
d~d to cover by their decision. 
Appellant cites Johnson vs. Brinkerhoff, 89 Utah 580, 
57 P:tc. 2d 1132. He says this case is nort in pomt fO!r here 
the parties had agreed to arbitrate "all" disputes. Here 
couns~l suggests that all the conracting parties intended 
to litigate by arbitration was (a) lialbility, and (b) dam-
ages. (Brief page 23 and 24.) One might ask, "What else 
is there left to litigate in any law suit but liability and dam-
ages?" Suppose that Mrs. Barnhart in this case had pur-
chased only a policy for uninsured motorist protection. 
What then would be left for the court if arbitration was 
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given the task of determi1lling liability and damages? In 
this particular case, the only part of the contract in issue 
is the uninsured mortorisrt provision and nOithing is left for 
any inquiry by the oOil.l:rt. What more oould be a com-
plete orusrter orf jurisdiction in the realm of liability and dam-
ages or any other judilcial realm insofur as the uninsured 
motorist poicy is concerned. 
The appellant makes a strained and teil1UOIUS argument 
in order to difterentiarte Latter vs. Holsum Bread Company, 
108 Utah 3:64, 160 Pac. 2d 421. All orf the argument is 
based upon the concurring opmion of Justiloo Woilf. The 
appellant fails to ooncede that three o~her justices in that 
case agreed as follows: 
"It is almost the universal rule fuat in the ahsence o[ 
a statute to the contrary, an agreement to arbitrate all 
future disputes 'thereafter arising under the contract 
does nort constitute a bar to an action om the comaJCt 
involving such dispute, om the ground that it seeks 
to deny rto the parties judicial remedies and therefore 
is oontracy to public policy." 
Apparently the dis:tinctioo contended fbr in the Latrt:e.r 
vs. Ho,lsum Bread case ~s that the court in its language used 
the word '1all" before "di~rputes", (Note: The cootrruct in 
that case did not use "all" disputes), whereas, in our case 
we are only talking abolllt uninsured motorists. We re-
spectfully s:tate to the court that this is a difference with-
out any more distinction than if the eontracts involved in 
the Fox Film Oorporatio!ll vs. Ogden Theatre Company, 
Johnson vs. Brinkerhoff .and Latter vs. Holsum Bread com-
pany eases had stated that only the question orf liability 
and damages would be litigated and all OltJher questions 
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would be reserv("Cl to the court. If these cases had said 
that, then it is the contention of the appellant that this 
court would not Ita ve held, in those cases, that arbitration 
was a void provision. 
In respect to the policy, it is interesting to note the 
following language in paragraph 9 of part 4. This para-
graph reads as follows: 
"Action against company: no action shall lie against 
the company unless as a condition precedent thereto, 
the insured or his legal representative has fully com-
plied with the terms of this endorsement nor unless 
within one year from the date of the accident: (a) stilt 
for bodily injury has been filed against the uninsured 
motorist in a court of competent jurisdiction or (b) 
agreement as to the amount due under this coveTage 
has been CO[l[Cluded, or (1C) the insured or his legal 
representative has fonnally instituted arbitrartio.n pT'O-
ceedings." 
The important aspect of this provision is that (a), (b), 
and (c) use the disjunctive worn "or." One could reason-
ably conclude that all that has to be done to comply with 
the terms of the policy is to comply with all of the other 
tenns of the policy and do any one of the three specified 
in (a). (b), or (c). In this instance the insured filed a 
suit against the uninsured motorist as required by para-
graph (a). This paragraph seems extremely burdoosome 
upon the insured for he does not own the suit and, as in 
this case, the law suit has been sitting without prosecution 
for more than a year. Or (b) he can agree with the com-
pany, \Vhich in this case could not be done. Or (c) he 
could institute arbitration proceedings. Apparently com-
pliRJ.ice with (a) would have been sufficient and, there-
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fore, the question orf arbitration is superfluous. No con-
tention is made that the insured did not comply with all 
the other terms of the policy. 
Paragraph 6 of Part 4 under arbitration states in the 
event fuat company and the insll.Wed are unab~e to agree 
"then upon written demand of either, the matte·r or mat-
ters upon which such person and company do not agree, 
shall be settled by arbitration in acooroance with the 
rules o[ the Am_e~rican Mbitration Association, and 
judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrators, 
may be entered in any court having jurisdiction there-
of. Such person and the company agrees to consideT 
itself bound and to be bound by any award made by 
the arbitrators pursuant to this endocsement." 
One would wonder, therefore, ·under the above stated 
teTms of the policy what provisions are left to 1Jhe court 
for determination. If this is a condition precedent, then 
after the condition is per:fhrmed, what is there left forr the 
court except to enteT judgment perfunctorily as a clerk 
might. 
One could wonder who will be 1:Jhe arbitrators for the 
pro\1sion merely states that the arbitration shall be in ac-
cordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation, but it says nothing a:bout who the arbitrators will 
be or how they will be appomted or whether they will be 
appointed under the auspices of the American Arbitration 
Association. Are these rules mere~y incorporated by ref-
erence? Are we compelled, as a matter of language, in 
the poHcy, to arbitration before this particular tribunal? 
We respectfully stae that the policy is silent as to these 
matters. 
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The law is tmiversally established in states that have 
not modified the common law by statute. American Jur-
isprudence says the law in these states is as follows: 
"The co~ts have held almost universally that under 
the common law the parties to a dispute may not oust 
the jurisdiction of the ,courts by an arbitration agree-
ment. And an agreement is not taken out of the scope 
of the rule by an express stipulation that suit shall be 
subject to the condition that arbitration first be had, 
except as it may be a condition precedent to suit where 
the agreement is for the! puvpose of finding prelim-
inary facts or ascertaining values. Although many 
courts in supporting the rule have called such contracts 
illegal and void, this characterization is criticized as 
wanting in strict accuracy, in view of the authority sus-
taining enforcement of executed agreements and of oth-
er cases that support a right to reoover damages in 1oase 
of breateh. Other courts have variously held that ~such 
agreements are invalid, vo~dable, or unenforceable, and 
that either of the parties to the arbitration agreement 
may revoke or abrogate the agreement at any time 
prior to the making of a valid award, and that not-
withstanding such agreement the courts will deternrlne 
all disputes between the parties." 5 Am. Jur. 2d 547, 
Sec. 36. 
The New York decisions set forth on page 24 orf appel-
lant's brief, are cases which have been decided in a state 
which has adopted the uniform arbitration act. These 
cases are, therefore, not in point. 
In Wilson vs. Gregg, 208 Oklahoma . 2~1, 255 Pac. 2d 
517 (1952) (1953), the court in an exhaustive review of the 
law. including cases under the statutes and cases under the 
common law, summarized its research and the law as fol-
lows: 
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"Generally arbitration agreements to submit contro-
versies arising in the future have been held unenforce-
able because they deprive the oourts of jurisdiction 
and are contrary to public pO!licy. The decisions of 
some courts hold that such argeements are void. Other 
courts hold that such agreements are voidable and still 
others hold that such agreements are nort enforceable. 
There is a line of decisions which hold that even though 
the agreernent is not enforceable it is binding if acted 
upon by both parties thereto and an award made. 
Some authorities have held that an agreement tO sub-
mit minor elements of ~ future controveTSy to arbi-
tration is binding. There is authority both in the de-
cisions of the ·oourts and in text writers sustaining 
arbitration provided for by constitutions, by-laws, rules 
and regulations of lodges and ortller vo~untary associ-
ations on the theory that such associations make their 
own rules and laws and the courts will not interfere 
with such associations enforcement of such rules. But 
the great weight of autho~ity is to the effect that an 
agreement such as is involved in this case is not en-
foriCeable and :that an action will not lie based upoo 1:Jhe 
findings and conclusions of the arbitratocs. There are 
decisions to the effect 1Jhat agreements to arbitrate 
are a condition precedent to an action on the original 
cause. We are not dealing in this case with any of 
the exceptions or distinctions above mentioned. In 
Oklahoma the common law orf arbitration prevails." 
Ameriean Jurisprudence in quoting the above case 
and in quoting the case orf Myers vs. Jenkins, 63 Ohio State 
101, 57 NE 1089, and the annotation found in 135 ALR 
85, says as follows: 
''The primary difference between a clause in a contract 
under which it is agreed that future differences ari5-
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ing out of the contract will be arbitrated, and an agree-
ment to submit to arbitration, a controversy that has 
already arisen, is that in the former case there is an 
attt.~pt to contra~t away the right to ,appear in a 
court before a cause of action arises, while in the lat-
ter ca~e. a cause of action has alredy accrued and the 
parties agreeing to arbitration make a choice as to 
the form in which the existing controversy may be 
cited." 5 Am. JUT. 2d 548, Sec. 36, Norte 15. 
Tha vVilson vs. Gregg case cited many prominent and 
respectable courts including tJhe decision of 1:1his court in the 
case of Johnson vs. Brinkerhoff, cited above. It would 
seem inappropriate to, at this date, overrule such a re-
spectable body of law and add additional fi<res to the charge 
being made against the judiciary of inconstancy and peT-
tidy. 
Some courts have attempted to distinguish a general 
arbitration provision from a condition precedent provision. 
The court will note that the specific language of our oon-
tract says that arbitration is the condition precedent. Our 
eourt has considered the case of Blodget Company vs. Bebe 
Company, 214 Pac. 38, and has cited that decision in its 
opinions with approval. That decision took up the ques-
tion of whether a contract that stated that arbitration is 
a condition precedent escapes the application of the com-
mon law rule that it is a void provision. In that case the 
cow1: said: 
"It is apparrent that where the cause of action is not 
complete until the establishment of a prescribed mode 
of a given fact, such fact is necessarily a ·condition 
precedent to the right of action; but where the right 
of action is complete, the bringing of suit thereon is, 
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of course, not impliedly subject to the oonditiorn that 
arbitration first be had, nor can it be expressJy made 
so unless we are prepared to abandon the establis:hed 
rule. This we think obvious from a CO!l1Sideration of 
the general rule itself and the consequences necessarily 
flowing from its appiioation. The rule is that an agree-
ment for the arbitration of any dispute thereafter to 
arise under a given contract will nort be enfo['lced by 
the oorurts. But such an agreement--is itself an attempt 
to make arbitratioo a eotnditiOltl precedent to the bring-
ing of suit and its effecrt is no different than from that 
of an express stipulatioo that arbitration shall be a 
condition precedent. Assume that the latter is bind-
ing; what woud be the eourt's pursuit under it? A 
disput arises and arbitration is had. An award bedng 
made, can a party to the stipulation say 'I have sub-
mitted the questioo in dispute to arbitration and thus 
complied with the condition precedent; nmv I will bring 
my suit upon my original claim and ignore the award.'? 
Evidently not, for if so the arbitration would be an 
idle proceeding.'' 
CONCLUSION 
The reSipOIIldent respectfully urges that the decision of the 
trial court be affumed. To do otheTWise would require 
the reversal of substantial law upon which rights and du-
ties have beoome fixed. In this particular case, the re-
spondent, because she relied upcm the prior decisions of 
this court co!Uld, if they were now revised or distinguished, 
find he,rself without any remedy either under the contract 
or in ~court. This we submit would be a harsh and unjust 
penalty. 
The respondent further urges the ooort to sustain the 
decision of the trial court on the basis of public policy. 
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Already too many judicial safeguards have been lost by 
legislative assignment, private barter and judicial abclica-
tion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON B. HOWARD, for 
HOWARD AND LEWIS 
Attorneys for Respondent 
290 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
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